Providence and Divine Mercy in Kant\u27s Ethical Cosmopolitanism by Frierson, Patrick R.
Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers 
Volume 24 Issue 2 Article 3 
4-1-2007 
Providence and Divine Mercy in Kant's Ethical Cosmopolitanism 
Patrick R. Frierson 
Follow this and additional works at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy 
Recommended Citation 
Frierson, Patrick R. (2007) "Providence and Divine Mercy in Kant's Ethical Cosmopolitanism," Faith and 
Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian Philosophers: Vol. 24 : Iss. 2 , Article 3. 
Available at: https://place.asburyseminary.edu/faithandphilosophy/vol24/iss2/3 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative 
exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faith and Philosophy: Journal of the Society of Christian 
Philosophers by an authorized editor of ePLACE: preserving, learning, and creative exchange. 
FAITH AND PHILOSOPHY
Vol. 24 No. 2 April 2007 144
All rights reserved
PROVIDENCE AND DIVINE MERCY IN KANT’S 
ETHICAL COSMOPOLITANISM
Patrick R. Frierson
For Kant, cosmopolitan ethical community is a necessary response to hu-
mans’ radical evil. To be cosmopolitan, this community must not depend 
on particular historical religions. But Kant’s defense of ethical community 
uses Christian concepts such as providence and divine mercy. This paper 
explores two ways—one more liberal and the other more religious—to relate 
the theological commitments underlying ethical cosmopolitanism with the 
non-dogmatic nature of Kantian religion.
1. Introduction: From Political to Ethical Cosmopolitanism
When scholars discuss Kant’s cosmopolitanism, they typically focus on his 
political cosmopolitanism, described in the Doctrine of Right and Perpetual 
Peace, and summarized as the “rational idea of a peaceful, even if not friend-
ly, thoroughgoing community of all nations on the earth that come into 
relations aﬀ ecting one another” (6:352). The ideal form for this commu-
nity would require nations to “give up their savage (lawless) freedom, ac-
commodating themselves to public coercive laws, and so form an (always 
growing) state of nations (civitas gentium) that would fi nally encompass all 
the nations of the earth” (8:357).1 For Kant, political cosmopolitanism is 
morally necessary. Kant insists that “states, considered in external relation 
to one another, are (like lawless savages) by nature in a nonrightful condi-
tion” and even if “no state is wronged by another in this condition (insofar 
as neither wants anything bett er), this condition is still wrong in the high-
est degree, and states . . . are under obligation to leave it” (6:344).2
The moral necessity of this pacifi c league is clearest in Kant’s Doc-
trine of Right, where his account of the need to form such a cosmopolitan 
“league of nations” (6:344) follows from his more general account of the 
need to form political communities at all. The need to leave the state of 
nature and enter into a civil condition arises, for Kant, from the fact that 
a right relation among people depends upon limiting the freedom of each 
such that “the freedom of each can coexist with everyone’s freedom in 
accordance with a universal law” (6:230). This is not simply an abstract 
requirement. It requires instantiation in concrete rights, especially prop-
erty rights, which receive authorization from “a will that is omnilateral . . 
. [f]or only in accordance with this principle of the will is it possible for 
the free choice of each to accord with the freedom of all” (6:263). As long 
as issues of right are sett led unilaterally (or even multilaterally), it is not 
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truly “possible for there to be any right” (6:263). Thus before human be-
ings leave a state of nature and submit to laws within a state, all rights 
are merely “provisional,” and the same applies to a state of nature among 
nations. As Kant explains,
Since a state of nature among nations, like a state of nature among 
individual human beings, is a condition that one ought to leave in 
order to enter a lawful condition, before this happens any rights of 
nations, and anything external that is mine or yours . . . , are merely 
provisional. Only in a universal association of states . . . can rights 
come to hold conclusively. (6:350).
Kant’s political cosmopolitanism, described in the Doctrine of Right and 
Perpetual Peace, thus involves the increasing interdependence of states that 
is necessary to ensure that people’s rights are grounded in a truly “omni-
lateral” will.
Grounding political cosmopolitanism on the same basis as that of rights 
more generally has important implications for the nature of that cosmo-
politanism. First, political cosmopolitanism is morally necessary to provide 
a legitimate basis of rights. Second, because political cosmopolitanism “is 
not an . . . ethical principle but a principle having to do with rights” (6:352), 
it does not relate to internal ends, either of states or individuals within 
them. As Kant emphasizes, “the concept of right . . . has to do . . . only with 
the external . . . relation of one person [or state] to another” such that “no 
account at all is taken of the . . . end that each has in mind” (6:230). Thus 
political cosmopolitanism neither depends on nor gives rise to good wills. 
Rather, it simply ensures that in their actions, human beings (whether as 
individuals or in states) act in ways that allow maximum freedom of ac-
tion for others. The fi rst implication, that cosmopolitanism is morally nec-
essary, implies that political cosmopolitanism would be required even for 
morally perfect angels. The second, that it deals only with external actions, 
makes this cosmopolitanism possible even for “a nation of devils” (8:366).
In his Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View and Religion within the 
Boundaries of Mere Reason, however, Kant discusses something that might 
be called an ethical cosmopolitanism: “an enduring and ever expanding 
society, solely designed for the preservation of morality” (6:94). In con-
trast to political cosmopolitanism, which seeks merely to ensure that the 
actions of states are in accordance with cosmopolitan right, ethical cosmo-
politanism promotes the cultivation of virtue. Unlike political cosmopoli-
tanism, then, this cosmopolitanism will be unnecessary for angels, who 
are already virtuous, and impossible for devils, who lack any basis for 
becoming virtuous.3 But like political right, and to an even greater extent, 
this ethical community must be truly cosmopolitan, encompassing all hu-
man beings: “a multitude of human beings united in that [moral] purpose 
cannot yet be called an ethical community as such but only a particular 
society that strives aft er the consensus of all human beings . . . in order to 
establish an absolute ethical whole” (6:96).
Kant discusses ethical community in the greatest detail in his Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, a work within which Kant recasts tra-
ditional Christian theological beliefs in terms of his own philosophy. The 
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Christian doctrines that form the backbone of the book are the doctrines 
of human sinfulness and God’s mercy, and Kant’s ethical cosmopolitan-
ism cannot be understood without reference to these central doctrines. 
But this dependence upon fundamentally Christian concepts taints the 
cosmopolitan character of Kant’s ethical project here. In particular, this 
dependence raises the question of whether an ethical ideal founded on 
specifi c theological claims can ever meet the requirements for a truly uni-
versal cosmopolitanism.
In this paper, I propose two readings of Kant’s cosmopolitanism that 
oﬀ er two diﬀ erent solutions to the problem of reconciling religious com-
mitment with cosmopolitan ideals. The fi rst, a “liberal” reading of Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism, insists that theological commitments are not a neces-
sary part of the content of cosmopolitan ethical community. A liberal need 
not rule out any religious beliefs per se, but only a necessary role for them 
in ethical communities. The second, a “religious” reading of Kant, sees a 
role for limited “rational theology”—including belief in God’s existence 
and mercy—as a necessary part of ethical cosmopolitanism.4 Each reading 
has advantages, and in my conclusion I suggest that Kant’s Religion within 
the Boundaries of Mere Reason can be seen as att empt to reconcile them, 
though one that ultimately favors the religious reading. Before turning to 
these interpretations, however, I must fi rst lay out in more detail why ethi-
cal cosmopolitanism is necessary, and what problems in particular these 
readings of Kant are designed to solve.
2. The Need for Ethical Cosmopolitanism
For Kant, ethical cosmopolitanism is necessary because of human beings’ 
propensity to evil and the role that social life plays in cultivating human 
evil. The notion of a propensity to evil comes from Kant’s recasting of the 
Christian doctrine of universal sinfulness in terms of his account of “radi-
cal evil,” and it is this doctrine that provides the reason for the importance 
of ethical cosmopolitanism.5 The locus classicus for this doctrine within the 
Christian tradition is the Apostle Paul’s claim in Romans6 that “There is no 
one who is righteous, not even one,” a passage that Kant explicitly con-
nects with his own theory of radical evil:
[I]f nowhere is a virtue which no level of temptation can overthrow, 
if whether good or evil wins us over only depends on which bids the 
most and aﬀ ords the promptest pay-oﬀ , then what the Apostle says 
might indeed hold true of human beings universally, “There is no 
distinction here, they are all under sin—there is none righteous (in 
the spirit of the law), no, not one.” (6:39)
That all are “under sin” is precisely the claim that Kant defends in this 
section of his Religion, a section entitled “the human being is by nature 
evil” (6:32).
Kant not only defends the existence of universal and radical evil; he 
philosophically describes the nature of that evil. In general, radical evil 
takes the form of a subordination of the moral law to maxims of self-love.7 
When a person allows him or herself to choose in such a way that the 
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moral law can be overridden by sensuous incentives, that person is evil. 
And this overriding need not occur all the time:
The statement, “The human being is evil,” cannot mean anything else 
than that he is conscious of the moral law and yet has incorporated 
into his maxim the (occasional) deviation from it. (6:32)
Kant is, in this sense, a “rigorist” about morality—even the occasional de-
viation from complete prioritization of the moral law to one’s sensuous 
interests constitutes “evil.”8
For Kant, however, radical evil goes beyond mere occasional deviation 
from the law. Human evil also involves the cultivation of a propensity to 
evil,9 a subjective disposition that makes one more likely to act on evil 
maxims in the future.
To become a morally good human being, it is not enough to simply 
let the germ of the good which lies in our species develop unhin-
dered; there is an active and opposing cause of evil which is also to 
be combated. (6:57)
Unlike the Stoics, for whom this opposing cause of evil can be found in 
the inclinations (see 6:58n), Kant insists that this opposing cause of evil is 
a propensity that is “brought by the human being upon himself” (6:29). 
Radical evil is not simply a matt er of choosing maxims that are themselves 
contrary to the moral law. It involves acting on maxims that constitute or 
bring about a propensity to and persistence in evil, an “active and op-
posing cause” of evil that must be combated in ethical life. One who is 
evil—and all humans are—chooses evil now and also seeks to ensure that 
evil will continue in one’s choices throughout life.
For Kant, however, the cultivation of this propensity to evil is not a soli-
tary endeavor. Human beings live in societies, and our social lives provide 
fertile breeding grounds for evil. As Kant explains,
If [a human being] searches for the causes and the circumstances that 
draw him into this danger [i.e., assault of the evil principle] and keep 
him there, he can easily convince himself that they do not come his 
way from his own raw nature . . . but rather from the human beings 
to whom he stands in relation or association. (6:93)
The primary means by which we cultivate our own worst tendencies are 
social.10 Competition, resentment, and a myriad of diverse desires arise 
only in social contexts, and the “passions,”11 which for Kant are among the 
greatest hindrances to self-mastery and virtue, “assail his nature, which 
on its own is undemanding, as soon as he is among human beings” (6:94). 
Radical evil manifests itself not merely in individual wrongdoing, but in a 
social climate that fosters vice.
This, then, brings us to the need for ethical cosmopolitanism. For Kant, 
the propensity to evil is not merely an unfortunate fact about human be-
ings; it sets an important moral task. As Kant explains,
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[A human being] remains . . . exposed to the assaults of the evil prin-
ciple; and, to assert his freedom, which is constantly under att ack, he 
must henceforth remain forever armed for batt le. (6:93, cf. 6:408)
Human beings cannot rest easy in ethical life. We cannot simply face 
each decision with the fi rm conviction to follow the categorical impera-
tive. Instead, we must recognize our own propensity to evil and actively 
arm ourselves against its infl uence. As Kant explains in his criticism of 
stoic ethics,
They drew the moral laws directly from reason . . . and so was ev-
erything quite correctly apportioned . . . subjectively, with respect to 
the incentive—provided that one att ributes to the human being an 
uncorrupted will. . . . The mistake of those philosophers, however, 
lay in just this last presupposition. For . . . we must rather start by 
dislodging from its possession the evil which has already taken up 
possession [in the will]. (6:58n)
Were human beings morally pure, ethical cosmopolitanism would be un-
necessary, and every reader of the Groundwork would become (or bett er, 
would already be) a morally perfect follower of the categorical impera-
tive. But because we actively promote evil in ourselves, we can become 
good only by combating this evil tendency. And because our propensity to 
evil is cultivated by our social relationships in particular, one can struggle 
against corrupting infl uences only through the moral reform of society.
The dominion of the good principle is not otherwise att ainable . . . 
than through the sett ing up and the diﬀ usion of a society in accor-
dance with, and for the sake of, laws of virtue. (6:94)
Thus ethical cosmopolitanism is the morally necessary consequence of 
our own radical evil. Without a social struggle for moral improvement, 
human beings will lay down arms in a batt le in which we are required to 
be ever vigilant.
3. The First Problem with Ethical Cosmopolitanism: Radical Evil
Radical evil is crucial for Kant’s argument that ethical cosmopolitanism is 
needed, but it raises an apparent problem for Kant because of two further 
commitments: (1) One can rationally hope to be fundamentally morally 
good and (2) There is no middle ground between moral good and evil 
since the moral law insists on unswerving obedience (rigorism). The fi rst 
of these commitments lies at the heart of Kant’s whole practical philoso-
phy, which is based on seeking the conditions of the possibility of moral-
ity. If it is impossible to be morally good—if there is no hope for us—then 
Kant’s philosophy is practically inert. The second commitment follows (as 
noted above) from the specifi c nature of Kant’s morality, and in particu-
lar from the categorical and universal nature of the moral law. John Hare 
nicely summarizes the challenge:
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If we want to keep morality as demanding as Kant says it is, and if we 
want to concede what Kant says about our natural propensity not to 
live by it, and if we want at the same time to reject these traditional 
Christian doctrines [of grace], then we will have to fi nd some substi-
tute for them. (Hare 1996:37)
Hare does not include (1) in this description, although denying (1) is a 
way to avoid Christian doctrines or their substitutes. One can simply ad-
mit the rigor of morality and our propensity not to live by it, but claim that 
we have freely fallen short and now are morally evil without any further 
hope of reform. This would be an option, but it is not one that Kant is will-
ing to accept.12
The doctrine of radical evil seems to challenge Kant’s commitments to 
moral hope and moral rigorism because radical evil, at least as Kant de-
scribes it, seems to be inextirpable.
This evil is . . . not to be extirpated through human forces, for this 
could happen only through good maxims—something that cannot 
take place if the subjective supreme ground of all maxims is presup-
posed to be corrupted. (6:37, cf. 6:45)
There are two reasons, for Kant, that radical evil is inextirpable. First, giv-
en that one has subordinated the moral law to sensuous inclinations, it can 
never be the case that one completely prioritizes morality over inclination. 
One’s overall moral status depends on one’s life as a whole (6:22–25). To 
be morally good, one cannot ever compromise morality. But if one has al-
ready compromised morality, even if one always does one’s duty from now 
on, one is nonetheless a person who, given the right circumstances (which 
may include temporal conditions), violates the moral law. That is to say, 
one is nonetheless evil. In Kant’s terms,
however steadfastly a human being may have persevered in such a 
[good] disposition in a life conduct conformable to it, he nevertheless 
started from evil, and this is a debt which is impossible for him to wipe 
out. (6:72)
The evil from which we have started provides a reason for the inextirpa-
bility of evil overall.
The second reason that evil is inextirpable is that one’s evil is not merely 
past evil deeds, but includes a propensity to evil. The fundamental maxim 
governing one’s life is a commitment to prefer inclination over morality. 
And this fundamental maxim provides no ground for its own overturn-
ing. One will not reject evil because the basis of one’s decisions is evil. And 
although obstacles to choosing rightly do not erode one’s responsibility for 
one’s evil, they seem to undermine the real possibility of moral reform.
Given rigorism (commitment 2), the inextirpability of radical evil leaves 
one without hope of being morally good. But Kant still insists that what is 
required by morality is that one do what is right, which includes improv-
ing the basis of one’s choices. As Kant explains, “In spite of the fall, the 
command that we ought to become bett er human beings still resounds 
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unabated in our souls; consequently, we must also be capable of it” (6:45). 
Kant is unwilling to give up his commitment to moral hope. But if one 
ought to become bett er, one must still be capable of moral reform. And that 
means that radical evil must be eradicable aft er all.
One approach that might seem promising, given Kant’s commitment 
to ethical cosmopolitanism, is to turn to society to overcome the radical 
evil that is found in each individual. In his Anthropology, Kant suggests 
something like this:
No matt er how great his animalistic inclination may be to abandon 
himself passively to the enticements of ease and comfort . . . , he is 
still destined to make himself worthy of humanity by actively strug-
gling with the obstacles that cling to him because of the crudity of 
his nature. Man must, therefore, be educated to the good. (6:324–5, 
emphasis added)
But Kant immediately realizes that the turn to education, or to the social, 
will not avoid the problem posed by radical evil. Instead, it only makes 
that problem more acute, because “he who is to educate him is again a 
human who still fi nds himself in the crudity of nature. This human, now, 
is expected to bring about what he himself is still in need of” (6:325). This 
challenge arises in any att empt of the human race to educate itself, but 
especially in the context of moral education:
Since good men, who must themselves have been trained for it, 
are required for moral education, and since there is probably not 
one among them who has no innate or acquired depravity himself, 
the problem of moral education for our species remains unsolved. 
(6:327)
A society of radically evil individuals is a seedbed for further evil, and 
thus Kant requires an ethical community to promote the social struggle 
against evil that marks our only hope for moral progress. But this ethical 
community itself depends upon having already overcome the very prob-
lem that it is supposed to solve, the problem of the propensity to evil.13
4. Solving the Problem of Radical Evil with Divine Mercy
Kant solves the problem of radical evil by invoking the doctrines of provi-
dence and divine mercy. In his Religion, he explains that “Some super-
natural cooperation is also needed to [a person] becoming good or bett er” 
(6:44).14 And in his Anthropology, he says, “it is only from Providence that 
man anticipates the education of the human race” (7:328).15 Kant repeat-
edly emphasizes, however, that this aid is inscrutable. In the Religion, he 
says that of “supernatural assistance . . . we can have not the least cogni-
tion” (6:191, cf. 27:331, 28.2.2:1120–21, 1225, 1319).16 To avoid despair, one 
must believe that there is some way to be morally good, but practical rea-
son will not condone any lenience in the interpretation of the moral law. 
Thus there must be some inconceivable supplement for our failings, some 
supplement that reason does not fully specify.
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It may be impossible for an individual to overcome the propensity to 
evil without some assistance, but God can mercifully provide for such 
transformation. From God, one can hope that one will be capable of over-
coming one’s own radical evil. But Kant makes clear that the revolution 
made possible by divine mercy does not absolve one of the responsibil-
ity to actively promote one’s own virtue. Even with the cooperation of 
providence and divine mercy, the most that one can expect is “an endless 
progress toward the complete conformity” of human wills with the moral 
law (5:122), a “batt le . . . against the att acks of the evil principle” (6:93) 
and a constant “struggle” (6:78) of one’s eﬀ orts to be good against one’s 
tendencies for evil.
Likewise, it may be impossible for the human species to overcome 
the social corruption that fosters the propensity to evil. Kant goes so far 
as to say that “even with the good will of each individual, because of 
the lack of a principle which unites them, [human beings] deviate . . . 
from the common goal of goodness as though they were instruments of 
evil” for one another (6:97). The corrupting eﬀ ects of society are strong 
and self-reinforcing, and “the problem of moral education for our spe-
cies remains unsolved” (6:327), at least at a human level. At the level of 
providence, one can hope not only for God’s merciful intervention facili-
tating individual transformation, but also for the providential establish-
ment of an ethical community: “To found a moral people of God [i.e., a 
cosmopolitan ethical community] is, therefore, a work whose execution 
cannot be hoped for from human beings but only from God himself” 
(6:100). Again, Kant does not take God’s role to absolve human beings of 
moral responsibility: “human beings are not permitt ed on this account 
to remain idle in the undertaking and let Providence have free rein. . . . 
Each must, on the contrary, so conduct himself as if everything depended 
on him” (6:100–1). Providence and divine mercy are an antidote to moral 
despair, an assurance that “higher wisdom will provide the fulfi llment of 
one’s well-intentioned eﬀ ort” (6:101).
5. The Second Problem with Ethical Cosmopolitanism: The Role of Religion
Invoking providence and divine mercy helps alleviate the apparent con-
fl ict between Kant’s commitments to moral hope, rigorism, and the reality 
of radical evil. Human beings are radically evil, but we still have hope of 
satisfying the demands of morality through God’s mercy.17 However, the 
invocation of divine mercy raises a potential problem with Kant’s account 
because of the nature of Kantian ethical cosmopolitanism and the sources 
of his account of divine mercy. In particular, Kant insists that ethical cos-
mopolitanism does not depend upon divine revelation nor upon specifi c 
features of any revealed religion, but divine mercy is a core doctrine of 
Christianity—especially German Protestantism—and Kant’s explanation 
of it is permeated with references to Christian Scriptures.
Kant was well aware of the importance of the doctrine of divine mercy 
within the Christian tradition, especially within German Lutheranism and 
the Pietist forms of that Lutheranism with which he grew up. Gordon Mi-
chalson describes his doctrine of radical evil as “a Kantian adaptation of the 
Lutheran simul justus et peccator” (Michalson 1990:117). Similarly, Robert 
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Adams points out how Kant is “like his Lutheran forebears” (Adams 1998:
xviii) and suggests that “his thought about good and evil in human nature 
is deeply att uned to the dynamics of the Lutheran piety in which he was 
raised” (Adams 1998:xv). And John Hare argues that Kant “takes the four 
central items of the traditional Christian faith (Creation, Fall, Redemption, 
and Second Coming) and the translation of these dictates the structure 
of the rest of [Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason]” (Hare 2004, 
cf. Hare 1996). The sense that Kant is drawing on a specifi cally Christian 
(even Lutheran) doctrine of divine mercy is heightened by Kant’s exten-
sive use of Christian Scriptures relevant to his account of divine mercy. In 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, there are over 100 references 
to Christian Scriptures, making up over half of the references in the text. 
The close connection between German Lutheranism and Kant’s doctrine 
of divine mercy need not imply a dependence upon specifi cally Christian 
authorities or arguments, but there is at least an apparent tension between 
the theological commitments that underlie Kant’s hope for ethical cosmo-
politanism and his account of the nature of that cosmopolitanism.
Kant allows ethical cosmopolitanism to involve religion in a sense. As 
he explains, “an ethical community is conceivable only as a people un-
der divine commands, i.e. as a people of God” and “the idea of a people of 
God cannot be realized (by human organization) except in the form of a 
church” (6:99, 100). But Kant is explicit that true cosmopolitanism depends 
on freeing moral religion from “revelation” and anything tied to “histori-
cal” or “ecclesiastical” faith (cf. e.g.,6:106, 109). For Kant, the need to free 
religion from anything historical or revealed is a necessary consequence 
of linking religion to cosmopolitan ethical community. For an ethical com-
munity to be truly cosmopolitan, it must not depend on anything that can-
not “be convincingly communicated to everyone” (6:103). Kant insists that any 
“religion” in an ethical cosmopolitanism must be purifi ed of contingent 
details18 of diﬀ erent “faiths” that cover the globe (6:107–8).
But this requirement of universality for the religion that underlies ethi-
cal community brings with it an apparent problem in the context of Kant’s 
discussion of divine mercy. On the one hand, Kant’s account of divine 
mercy suggests that it must be an essential part of any ethical commu-
nity. Without divine mercy, one apparently must sacrifi ce either the hope 
of moral progress, the rigor of the moral law, or the recognition of one’s 
own radical evil. Giving up the fi rst would make ethical cosmopolitanism 
hopeless, dissolving it in moral despair. Giving up the second would fail 
to be truly ethical cosmopolitanism and would cultivate a sort of moral 
laxity rather than true virtue. And giving up the third, in addition to be-
ing intellectually dishonest given “the multitude of woeful examples that 
the experience of human deeds parades before us” (6:33), would make the 
pursuit of ethical cosmopolitanism unnecessary, since ethical cosmopoli-
tanism is needed only to combat our own evil.
But on the other hand, the doctrine of divine mercy seems to be a spe-
cifi cally Christian doctrine, and Kant defends it in specifi cally Christian 
terms. As we have seen, Kant explicitly refers to the apostle Paul and to 
the Christian Scriptures in explaining the reality of radical evil, even con-
necting it with Paul’s claim that all are “under sin” (6:39, cf. Romans 3:9). 
And Kant draws his solution to this problem, at least in part, from Paul’s 
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further claim that “since all have sinned and fall short of the glory of God, 
they are justifi ed by his grace.”19 Kant’s discussion of the mechanics of di-
vine mercy is permeated throughout with Christian concepts and jargon. 
Kant discusses, for example, how the “son of God . . . bears as vicarious 
substitute the debt of sin for him, and also for all who believe . . . in him; as 
savior, he satisfi es the highest justice through suﬀ ering and death” (6:74). 
Thus whereas Kant’s doctrine of divine mercy seems to be an essential part 
of his moral religion such that any cosmopolitan ethical community must 
include this doctrine as an essential part, it also seems to be an idea deeply 
rooted in a particular faith, tied to specifi c revelation, and thus must be 
precluded from the context of any truly cosmopolitan ethical community. 
And hence, we have an apparent paradox.
6. Solving the Problem: Some Preliminaries
As clear as it may seem, this apparent paradox is not a real one. There is 
nothing strictly inconsistent with saying that divine mercy is necessary for 
ethical cosmopolitanism but that a doctrine of divine mercy has no place in 
that cosmopolitanism. If there is a God who is the Creator and Sustainer of 
the universe, then presumably the existence of God is necessary in order 
for human beings to exist. But even those who believe that God is Creator 
and Sustainer of the universe do not take this to imply that one must be-
lieve in God in order to exist. Similarly, it may be that divine mercy is nec-
essary in order for ethical cosmopolitanism to be possible, but that does 
not necessarily mean that members of a cosmopolitan ethical community 
must believe in divine mercy.
Moreover, Kant’s prohibitions on including contingent details of faith 
in ethical religion are directed against specifi cally historical aspects of faith. 
While divine mercy as a solution to the problem of human evil is a doc-
trine tied to a specifi c religious tradition, and while Kant draws heavily on 
historical features of Christianity in his explanations of divine mercy, he 
also interprets those features in ways that are less historically contingent. 
Thus with respect to the role of the “Son of God” as “savior” and “vicari-
ous sacrifi ce,” Kant interprets this Christian doctrine in a way that does 
not require any specifi c belief in the historical person of Jesus Christ as the 
Son of God, but only in some Son of God20 whose sacrifi ce atones for one’s 
past sins.
Still, however, Kant emphasizes the importance of divine mercy in giv-
ing a philosophical defense of the reasonableness of pursuing ethical com-
munity, but he explains grace in specifi cally Christian terms. Even without 
his Christian rhetoric, one might think that grace as a divine response to 
human sinfulness is a doctrine just too tied to historical Christianity to 
have a place in any truly cosmopolitan ethical community. And this at 
least raises the question of what role this doctrine of divine mercy has 
in the context of ethical community. The two ways of resolving the prob-
lem I have just mentioned, in fact, suggest two diﬀ erent roles for divine 
mercy. The fi rst resolution—that divine mercy is necessary but not belief 
in it—would imply that those seeking to promote ethical community need 
not specifi cally seek to convince others of the importance of divine mer-
cy, since such a belief is inessential to what ethical community involves. 
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We might call this the ‘liberal reading’ of Kant’s cosmopolitanism, since it 
does not require any specifi c religious beliefs. The second resolution—that 
divine mercy can be cleansed of its specifi cally historical features—sug-
gests that one can (and perhaps even should) promote this non-historical 
doctrine of mercy as a part of ethical cosmopolitanism. Thus on this ‘re-
ligious reading’ of Kant, religious beliefs are necessary for cosmopolitan-
ism, though not contingent religious beliefs.
It is important to note here, of course, that liberal cosmopolitanism is 
consistent with a great deal of religiosity, and a religious cosmopolitanism 
is consistent with a great deal of liberalism. With respect to the former 
point, one can be deeply religious at a personal and even corporate level 
while still holding a “liberal” view towards ethical community, as long 
as one believes that belief in the doctrine of divine mercy is not necessary 
for a fl ourishing and cosmopolitan community. With respect to the latt er, 
one can hold to a religious cosmopolitanism and still be quite liberal with 
regard to the diversity of ways of understanding divine mercy. To hold a 
“religious” stance towards ethical community is simply to believe that the 
belief in divine mercy is necessary for ethical community. And of course, 
neither view about ethical cosmopolitanism—religious or liberal—commits 
one to any particular view about political cosmopolitanism. In particular, 
the religious view that certain core theological doctrines are required for 
the fl ourishing of ethical community need not imply that these doctrines 
(or any others) are required for political community.
7. The Liberal Reading: 
Belief in Divine Mercy Is Not an Essential Part of Ethical Cosmopolitanism
As we have seen, the doctrines of providence and divine mercy play a role 
in Kant’s philosophical defense of the possibility of ethical cosmopolitan-
ism, but on the liberal reading of this cosmopolitanism, theological com-
mitment to divine mercy is not part of the content of cosmopolitan ethical 
community. That is, one need not actually believe in divine mercy to be 
fully a part of an ethical community, and one need not promote this belief 
as part of promoting “an ever expanding society . . . designed for the pres-
ervation of morality” (6:94).21
Allen Wood defends something like this liberal reading in his account 
of Kant’s religion. He argues that “I can have religion . . . even if I am an 
agnostic,” as long as I believe that it is possible that God exists and “so 
long as my awareness of duty is enlivened with the thought that if there 
is a God, then my duties are God’s commands” (Wood 1992:406). Wood 
does not specifi cally apply this liberal approach to divine mercy, but we 
can easily reconstruct what he could say. For Wood, the key relevant de-
sideratum in articulating the nature of a true moral religion is that “Kant 
does not want to fi nd moral fault with anyone whose religious beliefs fall 
within the range of opinion that is compatible with the theoretical evi-
dence” (405). And just as Wood’s “hopeful agnostic” does not actually be-
lieve in God but believes that God’s existence is possible and bases moral 
hope on that, the agnostic could refrain from actually believing in divine 
mercy, so long as she allowed that divine mercy is possible. Kant’s language 
sometimes even suggests that this is what he has in mind, as when he in-
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sists that “Reason does not contest the possibility . . . . of these objects” and 
describes a “faith . . . with respect to the possibility of this something” (6: 
52, emphasis added).22
We might even go further than Wood. As long as a person is willing to 
commit to the pursuit of virtue, they can be a member of an ethical com-
munity, whether they have any beliefs about divine mercy at all. As long 
as one does not both see divine mercy as necessary for virtue and deny 
its possibility, one can be a member of an ethical community. Philosophers, 
such as Kant, may need to posit some sort of divine mercy to make sense 
of how ethical cosmopolitanism could be possible, but ordinary people 
need not have any beliefs about this at all, as long as they are willing ac-
tively to promote ethical community.
For the content of ethical cosmopolitanism, this liberal reading has an 
important advantage. It suggests that the belief in divine mercy, which 
(in Kant at least) is closely connected with Christianity, is an inessential 
component of the moral religion about which one seeks “the consensus 
of all human beings” (6:96). Eliminating a need to reach consensus about 
the nature of divine mercy is particularly important given the confl icts to 
which that doctrine has given rise both within Christianity itself and in in-
teractions between Christians and others. These confl icts could pose prob-
lems for any proponent of ethical cosmopolitanism that sought to impose 
doctrines of mercy informed by Christianity on a world of Jews, Muslims, 
Hindus, Buddhists, agnostics, and others. The more one can eliminate 
doctrines of faith from ethical community, the easier it will be to promote 
a truly cosmopolitan religion.
Moreover, Kant points out that with respect to the doctrine of divine 
mercy in particular, belief in this doctrine can have a dangerously coun-
terproductive eﬀ ect on the cultivation of virtue. He explains that this doc-
trine is “very risky” because “what is to be accredited to us as morally 
good conduct must take place . . . through the use of our own powers” 
(6:191) and thus that
It can . . . be asked whether this deduction of the idea of a justifi cation 
of a human being who is indeed guilty . . . has any practical use at all, 
and what such use could be. It is hard to see what positive use can be 
made of it for religion and for the conduct of life. (6:76)23
What worries Kant here is the possibility that the belief in divine mercy 
will lead people to think that certain rituals or formulae can gain mercy 
in the absence of a life well lived. If people rest hope on divine mercy as 
opposed to a good life, then the doctrine of divine mercy will actually in-
hibit ethical cosmopolitanism (the purpose of which is, remember, to pro-
mote virtue), rather than promote it. Thus Kant emphasizes vehemently 
that “Apart from a good life-conduct, anything which the human being supposes 
that he can do to become well-pleasing to God is mere religious delusion” (6:170, 
Kant’s emphasis).24
On the liberal reading, then, divine mercy is not an essential part of 
ethical cosmopolitanism. One can be a member of a cosmopolitan ethi-
cal community without believing in divine mercy, and one can promote 
that community without promoting belief in divine mercy. This reading 
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has two important advantages. First, it fi ts well with Kant’s claims about 
the universal communicability of “pure” religion. Divine mercy seems not 
to be easily and “convincingly communicated to everyone,” so leaving it 
out of one’s cosmopolitan religion seems required. Second, belief in divine 
mercy can have a tendency to make people morally complacent, hoping 
that God will simply take care of them or that certain rituals will gain 
them divine favor. Purifying ethical community of a doctrine with these 
eﬀ ects would seem to promote the cultivation of virtue that it is the pur-
pose of ethical community to foster.
8. The Religious Reading: 
Belief in Divine Mercy Is an Essential Part of Ethical Cosmopolitanism
Like a liberal reading of ethical cosmopolitanism, the religious reading 
sees no role for merely historical aspects of faith, but a religious reading of 
Kant sees a role for limited rational theology—including belief in God’s ex-
istence and mercy—as a necessary part of ethical cosmopolitanism. Thus 
to be a fully participating member of an ethical community one would 
need to believe in God’s mercy, and to promote ethical cosmopolitanism, 
one would need to promote this belief. Since joining ethical communi-
ties and promoting such cosmopolitanism are morally required, belief in 
God’s mercy would thus be required.25 Despite the apparent problems 
with this view discussed in the previous section, there are two important 
(and related) reasons to advocate a religious reading.
The fi rst is that Kant seems to think that the belief in divine mercy is 
rationally required by anyone seriously pursuing personal virtue and 
ethical cosmopolitanism. Shortly aft er the passage quoted above in which 
Kant claims that “It is hard to see what positive use can be made of it for 
religion and for the conduct of life,” he adds,
The investigation is only an answer to a speculative question, but one 
that cannot therefore be passed over in silence, since reason could then 
be accused of being absolutely incapable of reconciling the human 
being’s hope of absolution from his guilt with divine justice, and this 
accusation might be disadvantageous to reason in many respects, 
most of all morally. (6:76, emphasis added)
Despite the apparent dangers of the doctrine of divine mercy, and thus 
Kant’s resistance to giving it too much weight practically, it is a doctrine 
that is necessary in order to resolve otherwise impossible confl icts within 
reason. And these confl icts, though speculative, are not merely speculative. 
They are morally “disadvantageous.”26 In this respect, the belief in divine 
mercy is like belief in the practical postulates that Kant discusses in his 
Critique of Practical Reason.27 Just as “it is morally necessary to believe in 
God” because “our reason fi nds [the possibility of the highest good] think-
able only on the presupposition of a supreme intelligence” (5:125–6), so it 
is similarly “morally necessary” to believe in divine mercy, because only 
divine mercy can reconcile moral hope with a rigorous morality.
Unlike the postulates, the need for divine mercy does not follow simply 
from the fact that one has a duty to obey the moral law, nor even from the 
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fact that this duty implies that “one ought to strive to promote the highest 
good” (5:125). One’s moral obligations combined with radical evil are what 
make divine mercy necessary. But although Kant’s the theory of radical 
evil is related to the Christian doctrine of sin, Kant insists that “only com-
mon morality is needed to understand the essentials of this text [Religion 
within the Boundaries of Mere Reason]” (6:14). And Kant’s overall defense of 
the reality of radical evil, although it uses Christian terms and references 
Christian Scriptures, is not based on Christianity. Rather, he sketches an 
empirical proof of radical evil based on “the multitude of woeful examples 
that the experience of human deeds parades before us” (6:32–33). As he ex-
plains, “according to the cognition we have of the human being through 
experience . . ., we may presuppose evil as subjectively necessary in every 
human being” and “the existence of this propensity to evil in human na-
ture can be established through experiential demonstrations” (6:32, 6:35, 
cf. 6:20). The essence of this demonstration is that people’s actions in the 
world provide irrefutable evidence that they have corrupt maxims, and 
thus that they are evil (6:24, cf. Frierson 2003:104–8). Kant claims that the 
presence of radical evil is something that “everyone can decide for him-
self” (6:39), but anyone honestly surveying their own life will fi nd ample 
evidence that one lacks a wholehearted commitment to always obey the 
moral law. In giving this empirical argument for the universality of radi-
cal evil, Kant highlights those aspects of the Christian religion that can 
be found “within the limits of reason (understood as including empirical 
judgments) alone.” In that sense, the quasi-postulate of divine mercy is 
grounded in an argument that can “be convincingly communicated to ev-
eryone,” and thus it is both acceptable within an ethical cosmopolitanism 
and (like the postulates) rationally required (though not proven specula-
tively)28 for those who genuinely seek virtue.
The second reason that divine mercy may need to be part of any ethical 
cosmopolitanism is the psychological correlate of the fi rst. It is not only 
irrational but also psychologically diﬃ  cult, if not impossible, to promote 
ethical cosmopolitanism (or even one’s own virtue) without believing in 
divine mercy. The psychological character of Kant’s concern here can be 
understood by a further analogy with the postulates of practical reason. 
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant revisits these postulates, but in a way 
that puts them in a more psychological light.29 He discusses “a righteous 
man (like Spinoza) who takes himself to be fi rmly convinced that there 
is no God” (5:452) and he asks what kind of life such a man will live. 
Kant explains that this righteous man will pursue the moral law from 
pure motives, but “his eﬀ ort is limited” because nature does not, as far 
as he can tell, cooperate with him. There are two possible results of this, 
Kant says. One is that such a Spinoza will eventually “give up as impos-
sible” his morally righteous ends, regardless of how “well-intentioned” 
he is. The only way to avoid this eﬀ ect on one’s disposition is to “assume 
the existence of the moral author of the world, i.e. of God” (5:452–3). Un-
like the derivation of the rational need to believe in God, Kant’s point 
here is psychological. Theoretically, human beings could be morally good 
without believing in God, but (according to Kant) atheism will “weak-
en the respect” for morality and “damage the moral disposition.” One 
should believe in God in part because that belief will function as an aid to 
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cultivating a moral disposition, whereas not believing will weaken one’s 
commitment to morality.
Kant’s psychological claim about the eﬀ ects of belief in God can be 
extended to his treatment of God’s mercy and divine providence. The 
arguments for the important of grace are rooted in a philosophical prob-
lem, but also in a psychological one. Without believing in divine mercy, 
one cannot reconcile the absolute demands of the moral law and the fact 
of one’s own radical evil with a continuing commitment to the moral law. 
And while it may theoretically be possible to maintain a long-term com-
mitment to the moral law while believing that one has no hope of meet-
ing its demands, this is probably impossible psychologically. Without a 
belief in divine mercy, the only way (psychologically) to avoid weakening 
one’s commitment to the moral law is to lessen the demands of the moral 
law or to deceive oneself about the severity of one’s own evil. Without a 
belief in divine mercy, the only options that are psychologically open to 
human beings seem to be moral despair, moral compromise, or hypocriti-
cal self-satisfaction.
If this psychological claim is true (and it is certainly an open question 
whether or not it is true), it provides important reasons for endorsing a 
version of the religious interpretation of Kant’s ethical cosmopolitanism. 
The purpose of ethical cosmopolitanism is to cultivate virtue in oneself 
and others, and the need for it emerges from human beings’ social nature 
and the way that radical evil takes advantage of that social nature. But our 
social nature is not the only aspect of our nature relevant to radical evil, 
nor to our eﬀ orts to correct it. We are also beings whose commitment to 
morality is aﬀ ected by our beliefs, and in particular our religious beliefs. 
Thus an ethical community must actively promote those beliefs that are 
necessary (or even helpful) to the cultivation of virtue.
9. Conclusion
In the last two sections, we have seen good reasons to advocate both a 
liberal reading of Kant’s cosmopolitanism and a more religious one. The 
strength of the liberal account is its commitment to the principle of “the 
consensus of all human beings” (6:96) that must underlie any truly cos-
mopolitan ethical community. However, a liberal cosmopolitanism risks 
embarking on a failing project if it seeks to promote virtue without at-
tending to the role that the belief in divine mercy plays in counteracting 
the moral despair that can come with recognition of the reality of radical 
evil. In this respect, the strength of the religious reading is its awareness of 
the rational and psychological importance of the doctrine of divine mercy 
in cultivating virtue in human beings. However useful this doctrine is, 
however, it is useful for a cosmopolitan ethical community only if it can be 
communicated in a way that can be universally accepted.
Here, however, Kant’s account of ethical community in the Religion 
can help provide support for a nuanced version of the religious reading. 
Although Kant appeals to Christian Scriptures more than to any other 
source in his Religion, he consistently interprets those Scriptures “within 
the boundaries of mere reason.” Given Kant’s recognition of the impor-
tance of the doctrine of divine mercy, Religion within the Limits of Reason 
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Alone can be read as a fi rst att empt at articulating that doctrine in ways 
that are not specifi cally Christian. Even the appeals to Scripture can be 
read not as historically rooted justifi cations of his claims but as models for 
how revelation should be reinterpreted to make it fi t rational religion.30 
Thus Kant’s accounts of radical evil, providence, and divine mercy pro-
vide universally acceptable versions of deeply religious claims. He gives 
what would otherwise seem to be historical doctrines of faith a cosmopoli-
tan interpretation, and thereby helps, if only in a small way, to promote 
that ethical cosmopolitanism which will bring about a universal commu-
nity of virtue, a “kingdom of God on earth.”31
Whitman College
NOTES
1. Because this ideal is impractical, Kant allows for a diﬀ erent structure of 
cosmopolitan right, a “league that averts war, endures, and always expands” 
(8:357). As Kant explains,
This league does not look to acquiring any power of a state but only to 
preserving and securing the freedom of a state itself and of other states 
in league with it, but without there being any need for them to subject 
themselves to public laws and coercion under them. . . . This could pro-
vide a focal point of federative union for other states, to att ach them-
selves to it and so to secure a condition of freedom of states conformably 
with the idea of the right of nations; and by further alliances of this kind, 
it would gradually extend further and further. (8:356)
Despite the concession to practicality that requires a “league” or “federation” 
of states rather than a single overarching state, Kant’s general point is con-
stant. Individuals in a state of nature must give up their lawless freedom to 
enter into a civil condition (a state), and nations must give up lawless freedom 
vis a vis one another to enter a cosmopolitan whole.
2. As Kant explains in Towards Perpetual Peace,
Reason, from the throne of the highest morally legislative power . . . 
makes a condition of peace, which cannot be instituted or assured with-
out a pact of nations among themselves, a direct duty, so there must be a 
league of a special kind, . . . a pacifi c league (foedus pacifi cum). (8:356)
3. Devils, as Kant understands them, are hopelessly committ ed to evil. 
They could not benefi t from ethical communities, the purpose of which is to 
foster one’s commitment to good, nor could they form ethical communities, 
which depend on people ingenuously seeking to promote goodness in them-
selves and others.
4. Calling this second reading a “religious” reading is potentially mis-
leading, since a liberal interpretation of Kant can be just as religious as a re-
ligious one. One could adhere to a liberal version of Kantian ethical cosmo-
politanism while still being quite religious personally, and even allowing for 
the possibility of religious belief within particular ethical communities. One 
simply denies that any religious beliefs (including one’s own) are necessary for 
ethical cosmopolitanism. In that sense, liberal cosmopolitanism need not be 
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secular—i.e. nonreligious—cosmopolitanism. It is also important to point out 
that one could hold what I am calling a religious view of ethical cosmopolitan-
ism while remaining a liberal about political cosmopolitanism. That is, one 
could see religious belief as essential to the promotion of an ethical community 
but not essential to the establishment of a stable political order.
5. This universal sinfulness is not the same as “original sin” as tradition-
ally understood within Christianity. Although the two doctrines are connected 
within Christianity, Kant is careful to distinguish his claim that human beings 
are radically evil, and even evil “by nature,” from any doctrine that would 
ascribe this evil to the choice of another person. For more, see Quinn 1984.
6. Paul himself develops this doctrine in the light of earlier Jewish sourc-
es. This passage in particular is taken from the Psalms (cf. Psalm 14:2–3). The 
doctrine becomes a central doctrine within the Christian tradition. For some 
infl uential examples, see Augustine, Aquinas’s Summa Theologica I–II QQ 74–
89, John Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion Books II and III, and Martin 
Luther’s The Bondage of the Will.
7. Kant says, for instance,
If [a person] took [incentives of his sensuous nature] into his maxim as of 
themselves suﬃ  cient for the determination of his power of choice, without 
minding the moral law . . . , he would then become morally evil. (6:36)
Throughout this discussion, it is important to remember that for Kant self-
love, or “incentives of his sensuous nature,” can include motives that are nor-
mally considered altruistic. The point is simply that one does what is in one’s 
sensuous interests, either in that it immediately satisfi es some desire that one 
happens to have or that it is conducive to the satisfaction of desires at some 
later date. Thus someone who acts from a good-hearted desire to see others 
fl ourish is acting from “self-love” in this Kantian sense.
8. This is a doctrine that Kant defends with reference to his moral phi-
losophy. As Kant explains, “a human being can [not] be morally good in some 
parts, and at the same time evil in others. For if he is good in one part, he has 
incorporated the moral law into his maxim. And were he, therefore, to be evil 
in some other part, since the moral law of compliance with duty is in general 
a single one and universal, the maxim relating to it would be universal and 
yet particular at the same time, which is contradictory” (6:25). The argument 
here starts with Kant’s account of the moral law, as “single and universal.” 
The moral law precisely commands that we will in such a way that we do 
not make our particular circumstances determinative for whether an action is 
right or not. But if we will diﬀ erently at diﬀ erent times or in diﬀ erent contexts, 
this shows that we have never really acted on a categorical imperative that 
commands that particular details not determine our actions. We have acted 
rightly sometimes, but even then, our underlying maxim allowed for devia-
tion, as is evident by actual deviation in a diﬀ erent context.
This rigorist doctrine thus fi ts well with Kant’s overall moral philosophy, 
but it is also an important example of religion within the boundaries of mere 
reason. The book of James in the Christian New Testament insists that “who-
ever keeps the whole law and yet stumbles at just one point is guilty of break-
ing all of it” (James 2:10). Kant here provides a philosophical argument to 
support a fundamentally Christian doctrine of rigorism, and Robert Adams 
rightly connects this with “one of the points at which his thought about good 
and evil in human nature is deeply att uned to the dynamics of the Lutheran 
piety in which he was reared” (Adams 1998: xv).
9. For an extended defense of the claim that human evil involves the cul-
tivation of a propensity to evil, see Frierson 2003: pp. 108–13.
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10. For more detail on this, see Anderson-Gold 2001, Frierson 2003, and 
Wood 1991 and 1999.
11. For Kant, “passions” (Leidenschaft en) do not exhaust the range of what 
we would today call “emotions,” and Kant does not think that emotions in 
general are threats to self-mastery. For more on the relationship between pas-
sions and emotions more generally, cf. Sorenson 2002 and Borges 2004.
12. I discuss this problem in a way that closely follows the discussion in 
this paper in Frierson 2003: pp. 113–16.
13. In this respect, Kant’s treatment of ethical cosmopolitanism is quite 
diﬀ erent than his treatment of political cosmopolitanism. In the political 
case, Kant claims that nature can make use of our unsocial sociability to 
bring about a just political order. Because political cosmopolitanism deals 
only with actions and not with motives, we can be led to it by considerations 
that are not specifi cally moral. But in the case of ethical cosmopolitanism, the 
nature of the change is more deeply ethical, and thus this ethical community 
cannot be coerced (6:96) but can only come about through genuine eﬀ ort 
towards moral reform.
14. See too 6:45, 6:61, and 7:328, where Kant makes clearer the connec-
tion between our duty to morally improve and our need for divine grace. To 
understand the specifi c roles that grace plays, it is important to remember 
that the two very diﬀ erent problems posed by radical evil (discussed in sec-
tion three). First, the stain of radical evil cannot be removed regardless of the 
extent to which one improves in the future since one has done wrong in the 
past. Second, radical evil seems to undermine the possibility of transforma-
tion by deliberately hindering one’s own moral development, promoting a 
“propensity to evil.” Kant addresses the fi rst problem with a conception of 
atoning grace, whereby one is justifi ed before God, “aft er the fact,” so to speak. 
The second problem is addressed by a conception of sanctifying grace accord-
ing to which God actually facilitates moral transformation. For more on these 
diﬀ erent senses of grace, see Adams 1998, Frierson 2003: pp. 114–22, Mariña 
1997, Michaelson 1990, and Quinn 1986, 1984, and 1990. Kant distinguishes 
them throughout the Religion (see e.g., 6: 143) and in the Confl ict of the Faculties 
(see 7:43–44). 
15. For passages that more clearly connect this providence with divine 
mercy in particular, cf. Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason, 6:44; and 
The Confl ict of the Faculties, 7:43–44.
16. Similarly, in the Confl ict of the Faculties, Kant repeats this point:
If worst comes to worst reason is entitled [befugt] to adopt on faith a su-
pernatural supplement to fi ll what is lacking for his justifi cation (though 
[reason is] not to specify in what this consists). . . . We need not be able to un-
derstand and state exactly what the means of this replenishment is (for 
in the fi nal analysis this is transcendent and, despite all that God Him-
self might tell us about it, inconceivable to us); even to lay claim to this 
knowledge would, in fact, be presumptuous. (7:43–44, my emphasis)
Like the Confl ict of the Faculties, the lectures on religion both before and aft er 
Religion emphasize the inscrutability of atoning grace and give litt le to no fur-
ther details. Religion was published in parts during 1792–1793. The Confl ict of 
the Faculties was writt en, at least in part, by December of 1793 (see lett er to Kie-
sewett er, Ak. 11: 456), but it was not published until 1798. In Religion, although 
Kant does point out that grace is ultimately inscrutable, he oﬀ ers some details 
about the way in which atoning grace works. See Quinn 1986 for a discussion 
of these details.
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17. There are numerous problems with Kant’s account of divine mercy 
that I do not discuss in this paper. For the purposes of this paper, I assume that 
invoking divine mercy solves the fi rst problem. My primary interest here is on 
the second problem. I discuss some of the problems with mercy as a resolution 
to the fi rst problem in Frierson 2003: pp. 114–22. See too Adams 1998, Mariña 
1997, Michaelson 1990, and Quinn 1986.
18. The full context of the passage quoted here shows that particularly 
clearly:
The only faith that can found a universal church is pure religious faith, 
for it is a plain rational faith which can be convincingly communicated to 
everyone, whereas a historical faith, merely based on facts [or on revela-
tion], can extend its infl uence no further than the tidings relevant to a 
judgment on its credibility can reach. (6:103)
At the same time, however, Kant does not require that all religion be freed 
from these historical details immediately. “Due to a peculiar weakness of hu-
man nature, pure faith can never be relied on as much as it deserves, that is, 
enough to found a Church on it alone” (6:103) and thus “because of the natu-
ral need of all human beings to demand for even the highest concepts and 
grounds of reason something that the senses can hold on to . . . some historical 
ecclesiastical faith or other, usually already at hand, must be used” (6:109). 
Nonetheless, the goal of cosmopolitan ethical community is to increasingly 
purge faiths of their impure elements, or at least to marginalize those contin-
gent features as merely vehicles for universal religion.
Robert Adams (Adams 1998: p. xxxi) rightly leaves “to the reader” the is-
sue of “whether Kant believes that an ethical community that would dispense 
with all commitment to historically conditioned doctrines and practices is a 
real historical possibility or . . . an ideal to be approximated.” For my purpos-
es, it is unnecessary to resolve this issue, since on either reading, it is the ideal 
that should govern the pursuit of cosmopolitan ethics (that is what it means, 
aft er all, for it to be an “ideal to be approximated”).
19. Romans 3:23–4. Although Kant does not explicitly quote this passage 
in the relevant context, the doctrine of divine mercy expressed in it underlies 
his whole account.
20. Kant even interprets this son of God to be one’s own self, in a sense. For 
details, cf. Quinn 1986.
21. Kant is not, of course, primarily interested in outlining membership 
requirements for being a part of ethical community. Anyone sincerely com-
mitt ed to the promotion of virtue can be a part of such community, and even 
those not seriously committ ed can be a part in the sense that an ethical com-
munity should welcome them as a way of helping cultivate their commitment 
to virtue. Nonetheless, the question here is whether Kant thinks that one truly 
can be sincerely committ ed to promoting virtue without certain religious be-
liefs, that is, whether these beliefs should be made part of the program by 
which ethical communities seek to promote virtue. I thank an anonymous re-
viewer for Faith and Philosophy for forcing me to clarify this point.
22. The fact that Kant says “possibility or actuality” here could mean that 
the actuality of the objects is no less contested than their possibility, or it could 
mean (as Wood may read it) that not contesting the possibility of the objects 
might be suﬃ  cient for practical life, even without any commitment to their 
actuality, but that a belief in their actuality is permitt ed as well.
23. These passages and others have led Robert Adams to claim that “There 
is no place in the Kantian scheme of things for prevenient grace—that is, for di-
vine assistance that precedes our fi rst turning toward the good” (Adams 1998: 
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p. xxi). For arguments that Kant is more open to the possibility of prevenient 
grace, cf. Mariña 1997 and Frierson 2003.
24. Immediately aft er this passage, Kant adds, “we are not thereby deny-
ing that . . . there might yet be something in the mysteries of the supreme 
wisdom which only God can do” (6:171). Thus Kant’s worry here is not about 
belief in divine mercy altogether, but only a concern about the practical eﬀ ects 
that mistaken beliefs about divine mercy might have. Cf. 6:117–8.
25. As Kant insists in his discussion of the postulates of practical reason, 
this “moral necessity to assume the existence of God” or of divine mercy 
should not be confused with a “duty to assume the existence of anything” 
(5:125). Working out the nature of the requirement to believe in divine mercy 
would involve distinguishing between a strict “duty to believe” and a require-
ment that is both rationally and psychologically connected to one’s duties. 
Fully working out this distinction is beyond the scope of the current paper, for 
which I need only the concept of a “moral necessity” to believe, rather than a 
duty in a strict sense.
26. Kant describes this confl ict clearly at 6:117, in the second prong of his 
“antinomy” of divine mercy.
27. In Wood 1992: p. 403, Allen Wood makes a similar comparison, though 
to a diﬀ erent purpose.
28. The nature of this rational necessity can be spelled out in more detail 
through further analogy with the postulates of practical reason. Kant’s discus-
sion of the sort of assent that is warranted here is provided in the Critique of 
Practical Reason (5:110–48). I will not here arbitrate between the diﬀ erent ways 
of interpreting his claims there, although this religious interpretation of Kant’s 
cosmopolitanism depends at least upon not reading this assent as merely a 
matt er of acting “as if” these claims are true.
29. Even in the Critique of Practical Reason, some aspects of Kant’s dis-
cussion (e.g., 5:143) are more psychological. For the purpose of this paper, I 
merely want to highlight this psychological aspect of the postulates. It is not 
my intention to make any claim about shift s between the second and third 
Critiques.
30. Kant explicitly discusses the proper way to interpret Scripture in both 
Religion within the Boundaries of Mere Reason and The Confl ict of the Faculties. 
His own use of Scripture could be helpfully studied as a model of the general 
method he lays out in those discussions.
31. I would like to thank the organizers of the Conference on “200 Years 
aft er Kant” (Tehran, November 2004) and the government of the Islamic Re-
public of Iran for inviting me to participate in this conference and for making 
it possible for me to visit Iran to present this paper. I would also like to thank 
Whitman College for funding my participation in the conference, for granting 
me time away from teaching to participate, and for a scholarly atmosphere 
that makes work like this possible. I particularly thank Bob Tobin for bringing 
to my att ention this conference and encouraging me to submit to it. Finally, I 
thank William Hasker and an anonymous reviewer for Faith and Philosophy for 
helpful comments on this paper, and I particularly thank William Hasker for 
permission to publish this article in Faith and Philosophy aft er an earlier version 
was published in Hekmat va Falsafeh, an Iranian journal of philosophy.
This article is dedicated to Philip Quinn. Professor Quinn personally con-
tributed to my own interest in Kant and Kant’s philosophy of religion, and his 
series of articles on Kant’s theories of grace and atonement (published in Faith 
on Philosophy) continue to be the most detailed account of Kant on grace. His 
recent death is a loss for us all. 
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